This article discusses the methodological challenges of legislative surveys. Following an overview of different types of survey biases, the article argues that self-selection and misreporting are the most critical problems for legislative surveys. In order to identify the self-selection and misreporting biases, we compare the answers to a survey from Swiss members of parliament with their observed behavior in the parliament. The empirical analysis shows that the survey sample has a substantial misreporting bias. We conclude that the parliamentarian's attitude towards the survey object is strongly linked to their response. These issues should be addressed to improve the design and quality of legislative surveys. †
Introduction
Surveys belong to the most popular research methods in legislative studies (Bailer, 2014) . Legislative surveys are particularly well established in Europe, while studies on the US Congress rather focus on the analysis of roll call vote data. In the age of big data, more and more information is available about Members of Parliaments ' (MPs) behavior. However, legislative behavior is often best understood by means of surveys, particularly when doing large comparative analyses. Surveys do not only provide information on the intention of MPs, but they also allow for drawing more wide ranging inferences by increasing the number of participants.
In the last couple of years, several studies have conducted surveys in order to study legislative behavior (Aelst, Sehata, Dalen, 2010; Kam et al., 2010; Martin, 2010; Bowler and Farrell, 2011; Zucco and Lauderdale, 2011; Arnold, 2012; Scully, Hix and Farrell, 2012; Bailer et al., 2013; Deschouwer and Depauw, 2014; Bütikofer and Hug, 2015) . Although legislative surveys are vulnerable to several methodological problems, they are rarely ever validated (Groves et al., 2011; Fowler Jr., 2013) . In contrast to legislative studies, the validation of survey data is well established in other research areas, e.g. postelection studies (Comşa and Postelnicu, 2013; Selb and Munzert, 2013; Sciarini and Goldberg, 2015; Sciarini and Goldberg, 2016) . These studies show that survey data tends to be biased. Similar problems are likely to populate legislative surveys. Krumpal (2013 Krumpal ( , 2027 Krumpal ( -2028 argues that social desirability is especially developed when the answer is sensitive. Since MPs are especially aware of public opinion, they may be tempted to misreport due to social desirability. Hence, this article illustrates the methodological challenges of surveys in legislative research. In doing so, the article argues that self-selection and misreporting are the main issues when conducting a legislative survey and illustrates how relevant those effects are and that the attitude towards the object of inquiry has a main influence on survey results.
This article performs a triangulation in order to identify the effects of selfselection and misreporting. Concretely, we take advantage of two different data sources to assess survey reported and validated behavior of MPs: On the one hand, we carried out a survey about MPs' demand for policy evaluation. In the survey, MPs were asked if they had submitted a request in order to evaluate the implementation or impact of a public policy 6 . In addition, such parliamentary request are also important for MPs who wants to fulfill their oversight function and control the government. On the other hand, we performed a content analysis of all MPs' parliamentary interventions to determine if the respondent's behavior was consistent with their answers. By comparing the self-reported and validated behavioral data, we are able to estimate the survey bias. The analysis shows that the survey sample is not affected by a self-selection bias, but the responses by misreporting. A comparative analysis suggests that the findings based on the survey systematically 6 See survey item in Appendix (Table 6 ).
overestimate the effects of exogenous variables. As a consequence, the sample should be adjusted.
This article is structured as follows. First, section 2 discusses the advantages and the methodological challenges of legislative surveys. Section 3 introduces both data sources -the reported data from the survey and the validated data from the content analysis. Section 4 presents different models, which explain the over-and underreporting of the parliamentary demand for evaluations. In addition, a comparison between data sets shows the consequences of a biased survey sample for models that explain MPs' behavior. Section 5 concludes by discussing the relevance of the findings for legislative research.
Legislative Surveys: An Opportunity with Challenges
Surveys are a useful tool to collect information on MPs. This technique offers two key advantages. First, surveys are relatively fast and inexpensive to conduct, particularly when performed online. While researchers may interview the MPs personally or send them a questionnaire by mail, scholars can also simply send MPs an invitation to an online-survey to their official email address. In this way, MPs can choose a suitable time for them in order to answer the questions, and interviewer effects are almost inexistent (Bailer, 2014, 177) . Second, surveys generate data that otherwise would not be available. MPs' behavior is generally well documented, but the motivation behind this behavior often remains unknown. Research projects regularly require the collection of latent information that is not readily or publicly available.
Hence, researchers often have no alternative but directly to ask questions to MPs in order to produce manifest data. While in many scenarios interviews would also allow the collection of latent information, surveys bear the important advantage of being often more resource-effective.
The advantages of surveys are indisputable. However, surveys often entail challenges that have to be dealt with. Since surveys often rely on samples and do not have a full response rate, the responding sample is rarely equal to the population of interest. Bethlehem (2010, 163-165) has presented a taxonomy of survey biases ( Figure 1 ). In doing so, he distinguishes between sampling biases and non-sampling biases. Sampling biases can be traced back to the sampling, since the estimation is based on a sample and not on the entire population. Two different types of biases are based on sampling biases. While estimation biases denote the effect caused by using a random selection procedure, self-selection bias occurs when the true selection probability differs from the selection probability specified in the sampling design.
Non-sampling biases are the type of biases that are not related to the sample.
Bethlehem further distinguishes between observation and non-observation biases.
On the one hand, observation biases refer to biases made during the data collection and take different forms: Over-coverage biases are made when units are included in the survey, which do not belong to the population of interest. Misreporting arises when a respondent does not want to give the accurate answer, when the respondent fails to give the accurate answers or when the respondent does not understand the question. Moreover, misreporting can also be caused by a lack of interest or an intention to provide a certain image. Processing biases are made during data processing (e.g. during data entry to a database). On the other hand, non-observation biases are either under-coverage biases or missing biases. Under-coverage occurs when members of the population of interest are not invited to participate. Missing biases refer to situations in which the respondents do not provide the required information.
Figure 1: Taxonomy of Survey Biases
(Adopted from Bethlehem, 2010, 164) Legislative Surveys are a special form of survey, since they differ from other surveys such as household panels or postelection surveys. As a kind of elite surveys, they are shaped by special circumstances. We argue that two types of biases are of particular interest for legislative surveys. First, amongst the sampling biases is the self-selection bias more likely to appear than an estimation bias, since a legislative survey relies (usually) on an exhaustive sample. The sample is usually defined as the number of Total Survey Bias Sampling Bias Estimation Bias
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Under-Coverage Bias Missing Bias seats in the parliament. Since the numbers are relatively small, it is often not necessary to draw a sample from all MPs. Second, amongst the non-sampling biases, misreporting is the biggest challenge. While processing biases are highly dependent on the quality of the research, over-and under coverage are unlikely due to the defined sample. Missing biases are not specific to legislative studies and they are well discussed in survey research (Little, 1988; Little and Rubin, 2014) . However, the MPs responses can be highly biased when their reported information is not accurate.
Both self-selection and misreporting bias have two components: random and systematic bias. While the former is only problematic for standard errors, the latter is in addition problematic for the estimated values. Given the main challenges faced by legislative surveys, we focus in the following sections on self-selection and misreporting and illustrate how they may influence survey results.
Self-selection Bias
The first challenge for every survey is to obtain a sufficient number of participants, as a high response rate is helpful to generate a non-selective sample. A high response rate often produces a more representative database than a lower one. In the last couple of years, rates of self-selection have generally increased (Brick and Williams 2013, 36; Massey and Tourangeau, 2013, 222 ) -this trend can also be observed for surveys among MPs (Bailer, 2014, 178) .
Self-selection can have a strong influence on the viability of the data.
Consequently, the likelihood of MPs to participate in a survey is important. Groves and Couper (2012) , as well as Groves, Singer and Corning (2000) argue that single attributes of the survey may highly influence whether the invited person participates in the survey or not. In the leverage-salience theory, the decision to participate is dependent on the "leverage" of some attributes, to which the invited persons assign a different salience. When an attribute has a great leverage on the decision to participate for many invited persons, the sample is likely to have a self-selection bias (Groves and Peytcheva, 2008, 169) .
Misreporting Bias
If the invited persons have participated in the survey, the next challenge is to find out whether they have answered the questions accurately. Misreporting is either possible when the MP does not want to give the accurate answer or when he cannot
give the true answer because he or she is not able to do it. Both result in the over-and underreporting of the accurate behavior. Overreporting occurs when a MP claims an action or belief that he or she did not undertake or share. In contrast, underreporting occurs when a MP neglects an action or belief, although he or she truly undertook or shares it. According to Belli et al. (1999, 90-91) , two different sources of misreporting are discussed in literature: social desirability and memory failure. While social desirability indicates the tendency of a respondent to answer in a most social acceptable way (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960; DeMaio, 1984; Tourangeau and Yan, 2007) , memory failure refers to the situation in which the respondent cannot remember an event (Groves et al., 2011) .
Social desirability and memory failure are both linked to overreporting and underreporting (Groves et al. 2011, 218) . Nevertheless, the reasons behind underreporting are much less clear. The literature simply suggests that respondents may underreport when the action or behavior is embarrassing or socially undesirable, as well as when there is a mismatch between the respondent's and the survey's understanding of the question (Tourangeau et al., 1997; Martin, 1999) .
Jackman (1999, (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) has formally defined the bias from self-selection and misreporting. First, he denotes that the survey estimate of x is not based on a full sample, but on the respondents' sample. The estimation from the respondents subset is denoted x (r) and the value of x among the non-respondents x (~ r) (each with weights r and (1 -r)):
where ϵ denotes the error term due to sampling (which is in most of the cases for legislative surveys E(ϵ) = 0). Second, he denotes the attributes x that increases the probability to participate in the survey in general (e.g. knowledge or interest in the topic of the study), when
The difference between the survey respondents and the non-respondents are reflected in the following model:
where ω is a non-response deflation parameter. Third, the measurement problem can be formulated with the difference between the true rate of x among respondents, x (r) and the observed rate ! (r) . Thus, misreporting can be formulated as
Finally, we obtain the total bias of self-selection and misreporting when we substitute both equations (2) and (3) in equation (1):
The next section introduces the data and the methods that we use in order to demonstrate the bias for self-selection and misreporting for legislative studies.
Data and Methods
In order to analyze the biases of legislative surveys, we will compare the responses of a legislative survey with validated MP behavior. In doing so, we supplement the ParlEval survey dataset (Brun and Siegel, 2006; Bütikofer, 2014; Deschouwer and Depauw, 2014; Feh Widmer, 2014; Strebel, 2014) .
7 For methodological issues, see Bundi et al. (2014) . During the four-year period mentioned above, 9'203 interventions were introduced by MPs, parliamentary groups, and committees. In order to identify 8 As MPs may have a broad understanding of what an evaluation is, the survey introduced a definition in its introduction: "In this survey, evaluations are interpreted as studies, reports or other documents, which assess a state's measure in a systematic and transparent way with respect to their effectiveness, efficiency or fitness for purpose." 9 http://www.parlament.ch/f/dokumentation/curia-vista/Pages/default.aspx [13.5.2015] parliamentary interventions representing demands for policy evaluation we performed a keyword search 10 on their title and full text. Following this procedure, 271 parliamentary interventions were identified and read in their entirety by one of the authors. This coder identified 20 "false positives" (i.e., presence of the keywords but no actual reference to policy evaluations).
The following analysis will model the reported submission of parliamentary interventions with a two-step model. First, MPs have to participate in the survey before they can (mis)report about their parliamentary interventions on policy evaluation. Some variables may affect both survey participation and misreporting.
Moreover, the sample could be biased by self-selection and unobservable factors such as memory failure or social desirability. Thus, a Heckman (1979) model is estimated in order to correct for selection. If the error terms of both equations are correlated (for survey participation and over-and underreporting), then the second equation has to be biased (over-and underreporting). Dubin and Rivers (1989) as well as Sartori (2003) have adapted Heckman's model for binary dependent variables. The equation for the auxiliary latent variables
10 The official version of parliamentary interventions in French was used. The keyword search was based on regular expressions for the following terms in French: evaluation, meta-evaluation, effectiveness, efficiency, legislative impact, regulatory impact, impact analysis, cost-benefit, cost advantage, cost-utility, outcomes and performance analysis.
where ! !! * is the underlying probability to participate in the survey of an individual i with their explanatory variables ! !! and the error term ! !! . In a situation with nonrandom selection, the equations for the selection models are
where ! !! is the observed dependent variable for survey participation and ! !! the dependent variable for over-or underreporting. The Heckman model estimates the likelihood to misreporting and takes the probability of the survey participation into
account.
In order to analyze MPs' survey participation, we include several variables.
Based on the leverage-salience theory, we assume that MPs that have actually submitted a parliamentary intervention to demand policy evaluation are more likely to participate in the survey than the other MPs, since this attribute may have great leverage on the survey participation. In addition, we include several variables that might influence the survey participation of a parliamentarian (gender, age, language and parliamentary group)
. 11 The models that analyze the over-and underreporting will include legislative professionalism and MPs' attitude towards evaluations. First, the degree of professionalization is an important MPs' attribute (Squire, 1992 (Squire, , 2007 .
Since the membership in the Federal Assembly is only a secondary appointment, the amount of time for the parliamentary mandate differs significantly amongst the parliamentarians (Kriesi, 2001; Bailer, 2011 
Representativeness of the Survey
A survey sample does not only rely on a reasonable response rate, but also on whether it represents the object of investigation. In order to control for such a selfselection bias, we have compared the participants of the survey with all invited MPs regarding different characteristics. 12 In the Swiss context, professionalization is widely understood as the time spent for the parliamentary mandate. We define the legislative professionalism as the time spent for the MPs mandate, in percentage of a full-time appointment. 13 The operationalization is summarized in Table 6 in the Appendix. In contrast, almost no differences can be observed regarding the committee memberships and the number of parliamentary interventions, which were submitted by the MPs. Hence, we conclude that the survey sample overall represents the investigated parliament quite well. 
Self-Selection and Misreporting Bias of the Survey
The self-selection bias is measured with a comparison between the validated evaluation demand of survey participants and non-participants. Table 1 shows that 14 An overview of the general self-selection bias is shown in Table 7 in the Appendix.
the participants and non-participants do not differ systematically in their demand for evaluations. A majority of both groups (about 66%) have indicated that they have never submitted a parliamentary intervention in order to demand an evaluation.
Moreover, the share of MPs that have submitted an evaluation demand several times is slightly higher amongst the survey non-participants than the participants (15.8% to 13.4%). MPs that have submitted an evaluation demand did not participate in the survey more frequently. Thus, the data suggests with an overall self-selection bias of 1.4% that there is no systematic self-selection bias in the survey sample. Note: The total self-selection bias within each column is estimated by the difference between the participations and the non-participations of the survey. The overall self-selection bias is estimated by the addition of all self-selection biases and is weighted for the number of MPs 15 .
In order to estimate the misreporting bias, we compare the reported data with the validated data of the survey participants (Table 2) . 16 According to the survey,
22.7% of MPs have reported that they have submitted a parliamentary intervention
15 Usually, the Swiss Federal Assembly consists of 246 MPs (200 lower chamber and 46 upper chamber). However, during the time of the survey, a seat in the upper chamber was vacant . 16 We excluded the parliamentarians who answered the question whether they have submitted a parliamentary intervention in order to demand evaluation with "Don't know" (N=8) and "No answer" (N=7). As a consequence, the survey sample reduced from 112 to 97.
demanding an evaluation once, while 33.0% reported to have done it several times.
Here the reported data differs significantly from the validated data. Note: The total misreporting bias within each column is estimated by the difference between the participations and the non-participations of the survey. The overall misreporting bias is estimated by the addition of all misreporting bias and is weighted for the number of MPs.
Albeit the reported data clearly shows a misreporting bias, it is not clear whether the MPs have over-or underreported. 
Misreporting: What Factors Explain Over-and Underreporting?
As a next step, we will try to identify which determinants influence participation in the survey, as well as over-und underreporting in the survey. Table 4 presents the findings of the separate probit models for survey participation, over-and underreporting, as well as the findings of the Heckman selection models. Model 1 illustrates the probit model to participate in the survey. 17 The percentage of people who underreport their participation in elections is usually about 1% (Sciarini and Goldberg, 2016, 12) . There is no comparable estimation for legislative surveys in the literature. 18 We have also estimated models with the time that has passed between a parliamentary intervention and the survey in order to account for possible memory failures. This variable has no significant effect (p-value >0.7) However, this variable would have had substantially decreased the number of observations, since we can only estimate this variable for those MPs who submitted an intervention and participated in the survey (n=38). For this reason, we have decided to omit the time variable According to the model, the likelihood of MPs of left parties to participate in the survey is slightly significantly 19 higher. This result is evident, since we have a slightly higher participation of left parties in the survey ( Table 7) . Since significance disappears for left parties in model 5, we have to assume that the effect is not robust.
Hence, models 1 and 5 support the conclusion that the sample is not biased by selfselection.
Regarding the misreporting of MPs, both in terms of over-and underreporting, the models show different results. Model 2 shows that MPs with a highly positive attitude towards evaluations have a 53% 20 higher probability to overreport than those parliamentarians with a negative attitude (Figure 2 ). Not surprisingly, MPs that have submitted a parliamentary intervention to demand an evaluation have a lower probability to overreport -since they cannot overreport when they have truly performed the action in question.
The results for underreporting are contrasting (Model 3). The more negative the attitude towards evaluations, the higher the MPs' likelihood to underreport. In addition, women tend to underreport less than their male colleagues (Figure 3 ).
However, the gender effect dissolves with a positive attitude towards evaluations.
Evidence from other domains is ambiguous: Whereas research in epidemiology shows conform findings that women are less prone to social desirability effects (Hebert et al. 1997; Ambwani and Chmielewski 2013) , literature from business studies presents opposite or inconclusive results (Chung and Monroe 2003; Murphy 2012) . A convincing theoretical explanation is missing, which explains why women with a negative attitude towards evaluations underreport less than men. Since female MPs are overall younger, have a shorter experience in parliament, are less established politicians, and belong more often to the French speaking and to the left wing parties than their male colleagues, a spurious correlation seems to be the most obvious explanation for this finding. Furthermore, the submission of a parliamentary intervention has a highly significant influence on the likelihood to underreport. This is again not surprising, since submitting an intervention is a precondition for underreporting.
Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Survey Overreporting for the Attitude towards Evaluation 21 and the Gender 22
21 The scale of the attitude towards evaluations ranges from 1 (negative) to 4 (positive) 22 Reference categories: German, center party, mean age, mean professionalization and evaluation demand. 
Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Survey Underreporting for the Attitude towards Evaluation and the Gender
The Heckman models 4 and 5 show similar results. This means that omitting for the survey participation does not lead to an inconsistent estimation for over-and underreporting. Since the likelihood ratio tests of the independent equations are not significant, we do not have to control for selection.
The Effects of Self-selection and Misreporting
Finally, we will reconstruct the analysis of Bundi (2016) that investigates the determinants for the MPs' demand for evaluations (Table 5) . In doing so, we compare the findings for the reported evaluation demand (Model 6) and the validated evaluation demand (Model 7). The table shows that almost all effects decrease with some exceptions. Female MPs have a significant higher propensity to report an evaluation demand, however, this effect disappears on the validated demand for policy evaluation.
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The model shows that the attitude towards evaluation has a highly significant influence on whether a MP reports an evaluation demand (Figure 4) . However, the attitude and the gender have no influence on the actual behavior. MPs with a negative attitude towards evaluations do not significantly demand fewer evaluations than those MPs with a positive attitude ( Figure 5 ). Since model estimation 6 overperforms model 7 clearly, we can conclude that common explanatory variables are better in explaining evaluation demand reporting than actual evaluation demand.
Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities of Reported Evaluation Demand for the Attitude towards Evaluations and the Gender 23
23 Reference categories: mean age, mean bureaucratic drift, mean professionalization, mean parliament seniority, oversight committee member, parliament board member. The analysis shows that the attitude towards the object, in our case the evaluation, has an influence on the survey results. Since the MPs' attitude towards evaluations influences overreporting in a positive and underreporting in negative way, the overall analysis is biased. The question is why attitude has such an influence on misreporting and how we can deal with this instance. It is often argued in literature that social desirability and memory failure are the reason for misreporting. How are these concepts linked to the attitude towards the object of research?
24 Reference categories: mean age, mean bureaucratic drift, mean professionalization, mean parliament seniority, oversight committee member, parliament board member. According to Krumpal (2013 Krumpal ( , 2018 , social desirability refers to the tendency of the respondents to agree to socially desirable attitudes. Either social desirability appears when a respondent refers to a characteristic to receive approval of somebody (interviewee, peers, general public, etc.) or when a survey item is especially susceptible to give socially desirable answers. Even though evaluation is not a particularly sensitive topic, the attitude towards it can nevertheless influence the survey responses. We argue that the attitude interacts with social desirability and memory failure. A person with a more positive attitude will more likely feel the pressure to overreport due to social desirability. In contrast, the effect for a person with a more negative attitude goes in the opposite direction, since the person cares less about the objective and is more susceptible to memory failures. Therefore, the person will less likely overreport, in fact even underreport due to the circumstance that he or she may underestimate his or her activity, due to a lack of memory. As a consequence, a negative attitude can theoretically influence memory failure.
To sum up, we argue that scholars have to pay attention to the attitude towards the object of a survey, since the attitude may influence the reporting of this activity.
A positive attitude interacts with social desirability and fosters overreporting, while a negative attitude has an influence on memory failure and leads to underreporting.
Conclusion
In this article, we have reviewed the methodological challenges of legislative surveys, namely sampling, participation, response and misreporting biases (Traugott and Karosh, 1979; Belli et al., 1999; Groves et al., 2002, Ansolabehere and Hersh, 2012 This study has some limitations. First, the number of observations is rather small to obtain robust results. Although our dataset provides a full sample of all Swiss MPs at the federal level, the number of studied MPs should ideally be increased to produce more reliable findings. Second, our dataset suggests that one can rather focus on the misreporting bias then on the self-selection bias. Albeit this makes it easier for the survey researcher to concentrate on a specific methodological problem, the data also shows that the underreporting percentage is much higher compared to other types of surveys, such as postelection or household panel surveys.
Thus, scholars relying on legislative surveys have to deal not only with overreporting, but also with underreporting. Underreporting is a well-known challenge in elite surveys, in particular when the respondents have rather a high status amongst the participants (Fowler et al., 2011, 456) or the answer is sensitive (Corstange, 2008, 45) . In the case of our empirical illustration, MPs may have underreported as a result of different understandings of the object of the survey (e.g.
"evaluation"). Despite the fact that we provided an explicit definition for "evaluation"
in the questionnaire to reduce this problem, we cannot entirely exclude that MPs may have responded with a different definition of the concept in mind. Last, the attitude towards an object cannot only influence responses on the object itself, but also the participation. However, we cannot empirically analyze this question, since we lack information on the attitude of the MPs that did not participate in the survey.
A possibility for further application would be to estimate the attitude towards evaluations, with the limitations that some MPs might have no attitude at all.
This article has made an important contribution to understand how methodological issues can influence the results of a legislative survey. In legislative research, literature indicates that the role of legislatives may increase in the future and will be more studied (Beichelt, 2012; Winzen, 2013; Russel, Gover and Wollter 2015) . Since the number of legislative surveys will most likely increase as a consequence, scholars should pay attention to the validity of survey results. In this regard, our article is a helpful starting point in the study of the methodological challenges of legislative surveys. While our analyses provide limited conclusions regarding social desirability and memory failure, we hope to stimulate more studies digging deeper into the phenomenon of MPs' misreporting. 
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